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REFRAMING THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE TO MOVE 
BEYOND ARGUMENTS FOR DIVERSITY AND INTEREST 
CONVERGENCE 
Adrian Jamal McLain* 
Steven L. Nelson** 
ABSTRACT 
Critical race theorists have long accepted the interest convergence dilemma as 
indispensable in discussions of civil rights in the United States. In this paper, we 
argue that the interest convergence dilemma is insufficient to account for outcomes 
that show persistently and consistently inequitable academic, social, and occupa-
tional opportunities and outcomes for Black students. In particular, we analyze 
federal courts’ handling of affirmative action cases to showcase how federal 
courts’ efforts to apply the diversity rationale rather than the historical rationale 
serve to infuse antiblackness into higher education policy. We first analyze Su-
preme Court of the United States cases involving affirmative action policies. We 
reframe earlier cases aimed at ensuring that black students had access to institu-
tions of higher education to argue that affirmative action policies existed as early as 
the 1930s. Next, we discuss the antiblackness of the diversity rationale and how the 
diversity rationale impacts black and white students differently. We thereafter sug-
gest that the interest convergence dilemma is flawed in that black students’ inter-
ests cannot and do not converge with those of white students. Indeed, the interests 
of white students are paramount, and Black students’ interests are not only second-
ary but are actually only entertained as they relate to white students’ interests. We 
showcase the continued antiblackness of affirmative action policies by explaining 
how recent federal cases have resulted in white students being prioritized even at 
historically Black colleges and universities (HBCU). 
 _________________________  
 * Adrian Jamal McLain is a doctoral student in the Department of Leadership & Policy Studies at the 
University of Memphis. He earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Alcorn State University 
and his Master of Science degree in Higher Education Administration from Mississippi College. His research 
agenda interrogates the impact of whiteness and antiblackness on educational leadership, Historically Black Col-
leges and Universities, and postsecondary access. 
 ** Steven L. Nelson is the Assistant Professor of Education Law and Education Policy in the Department 
of Leadership & Policy Studies at the University of Memphis. He earned his Ph.D from the Department of Educa-
tion Policy Studies at the Pennsylvania State University and his J.D from the University of Iowa’s College of Law. 
His research considers how education reform policies purporting to pursue equitable educational opportunities and 
outcomes for Black students, families, and communities often result in the continued racial subjugation of Black 
peoples.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Historically Black colleges and universities are essential educational institu-
tions within the higher education community. In 2015, the Thurgood Marshall Col-
lege Fund reported that 40% of black engineers, 50% of Black professors who 
teach at nonhistorically Black institutions, and 80% of Black judges are graduates 
of HBCUs, despite HBCUs enrolling only 9% of Black college students.1 Overall, 
college enrollment rates for black students are under 40%—at roughly 36%.2 Black 
students are typically the objects of damage-centered research3 or are often repre-
sented by statistics as being less educated and less likely to attend college.4 How-
ever, these outcomes correlate to the marginalizations that result from the histories 
and political economies of Black, particularly low-income Black, communities 
operating within a white-dominated society.5  
To remedy historical wrongs of the discriminatory past faced by Black people 
in the United States, institutions of higher education adopted affirmative action 
admissions policies to address persistently and consistently lower enrollments of 
Black students.6 While students from marginalized communities, particularly Black 
students, were given access to traditionally white institutions of higher education, 
white Americans perceived that increased efforts at diversity at and in institutions 
of higher education would have forced white students to compete against marginal-
ized students who were previously precluded from attending from admission to the 
most competitive state-sponsored institutions of higher education. For example, 
when denied admission into the University of Texas at Austin, Abigail Fisher of 
the Fisher v. University of Texas7 case felt she was qualified (or at least more quali-
fied than students from marginalized communities) and chose to sue to earn a spot 
at a competitive state university; the federal courts agreed to hear Fisher’s case 
although she failed to meet the academic qualifications of admittees on most objec-
 _________________________  
 1. Historically Black Colleges and Universities, THURGOOD MARSHALL COLLEGE FUND, 
https://www.tmcf.org/about-us/our-schools/hbcus (last visited February 4, 2018); see also TELL  
THEM WE ARE RISING: THE STORY OF BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (Firelight Films  
2018). 
 2. Historically Black Colleges and Universities, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS,  
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=667 (last visited, February 4, 2018). 
 3. See generally Eve Tuck, Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 409 
(2009) (distinguishing damage-centered versus desire-based research). We side with Eve Tuck, asserting that 
research must envision communities subjected to marginalization, disenfranchisement, and oppression as creating 
cultures that express a desire other than to replicate the dominant culture, whiteness. 
 4. Walter R. Allen, Black Students in U.S Higher Education: Toward Improved Access, Adjustment, and 
Achievement, 20 URB. REV. 165, 185 (1988) For instance, Walter R. Allen asserts “[B]lack students lag behind 
their Asian, American Indian, Hispanic, and white peers in terms of high school grades, SAT scores, and college 
grades.” In fairness, Allen does go on to identify institutions of higher education’s role in sustaining inequitable 
educational opportunities and outcomes. 
 5. See generally JEAN ANYON, RADICAL POSSIBILITIES: PUBLIC POLICY, URBAN EDUCATION, AND A NEW 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT (2d ed. 2015). 
 6. Kristen M. Glasener, Christian A. Martell, & Julie R. Posselt, Framing Diversity: Examining the Place 
of Race in Institutional Policy and Practice Post-Affirmative Action, 12 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 3 (2019); see 
also, Dorothy F. Garrison-Wade & Chance W. Lewis, Affirmative Action: History and Analysis, 185 J. C. 
ADMISSIONS 23 (2006). 
 7. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
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tive admission criteria used at the University of Texas at Austin.8 The Fisher case, 
in concert with the history of both school desegregation and affirmative action in 
higher education admissions, is a demonstration of what happens—historically—
whenever white supremacy is challenged.9 Ultimately, Black people benefit very 
little and, instead, the heavy oppression of Black people follows. 
It is relatively simple to understand affirmative action’s diversity rationale 
through the lens of critical race theory. Interest convergence, a tenant of critical 
race theory, asserts that white Americans’ interests have prevailed in affirmative 
action policy and legal cases.10 Our primary thesis in this article is that the Supreme 
Court of the United States’s preference for the diversity rationale over the historical 
rationale maintains white supremacy as affirmative action is applied to higher edu-
cation. In making this argument, we also argue that the diversity rationale of af-
firmative action policies and judicial decisions is, in no way, a convergence of in-
terests between white and Black stakeholders. We, instead, proffer that interest 
convergence is only applicable to the extent that white stakeholders, powerbrokers, 
and citizens get to set the agenda for Black people. We argue that the diversity ra-
tionale, without historical content, reproduces colorblind policies and procedures 
that aim to silence and erase Black suffering.11 This and other antiblack policies are 
problematic for Black people because affirmative action higher education policies 
ultimately only serve to accommodate the interests of white students.12 However, 
as opponents of affirmative action continue to create correlating policies that con-
tinue to advantage white students at the expense of Black students, HBCUs are in a 
prime position to offer postsecondary opportunities for Black and other underrepre-
sented minority students. Further, in a society that continues to lean toward the 
reproduction of colorblind policies, HBCUs have the opportunity to combat the 
antiblackness of affirmative action by reproducing pro-Black ideologies within 
Black and Brown student bodies. 
This paper includes three major segments. The first segment of this paper will 
address early affirmative action lawsuits and how these cases have shaped affirma-
tive action policy. The second segment will focus on the relationship between an-
tiblackness and the diversity rationale of affirmative action coupled with how the 
term diversity has been redefined by whiteness, which is not in the best interest of 
Black people. We then problematize the understanding that affirmative action and 
diversity are or can be the convergence of Black and white interests. Finally, we 
discuss the potential impact of HBCUs, especially as these potential impacts can 
serve to advance a liberatory educational agenda for Black people.  
 _________________________  
 8. See Steven L. Nelson, Different Script, Same Caste in the Use of Passive and Active Racism: A Critical 
Race Theory Analysis of the (Ab)use of “House Rules” in Race-Related Education Cases, 22 WASH. & LEE J. 
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 297, 320 (2016). 
 9. See generally id. (arguing that the Supreme Court of the United States’ acceptance of white people’s 
attacks on affirmative action is a continuation of white people’s interposition to desegregation). 
 10. Glasener, supra note 6, at 4. 
 11. Rican Vue, Siduri Jayaram Haslerig, & Walter R. Allen, Affirming Race, Diversity, and Equity 
Through Black and  
Latinx Students’ Lived Experiences, 54 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 868, 869 (2017). 
 12. Nelson, supra note 8, at 321. 
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II.  HIGHER EDUCATION AFFIRMATIVE ACTION COURT CASES 
For decades following Plessy v. Ferguson13, the separate but equal doctrine 
dominated American society. Separate but equal—the Supreme Court’s infamous 
and oppressive precedential ruling—embraced and reproduced systemic discrimi-
nation and segregation and dominated educational institutions, workplaces, and 
life. Brown v. Board of Education was a watershed moment in equity-oriented 
precedent, for it explicitly overturned the Plessy decision, making segregation un-
constitutional.14 Less known, however, is that cases about access to higher educa-
tion paved the way for Brown. The cases that preceded Brown focused on creating 
equitable educational opportunities and outcomes for Black people and had consid-
erable impacts on the landscape of higher education admission policies for Black 
students. As early as 1938, in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,15 followed by 
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma16 in 1948, and Sweatt v. 
Painter17 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents18 in 1950, the Supreme Court 
of the United States ruled in favor of Black students. In these cases, the Court for-
bade state-supported institutions of higher learning from denying admission to 
Black students to graduate and professional programs on the basis of race alone, 
holding that such actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.  
Missouri ex rel. Gaines and Sipuel guided the decisions of Sweatt19 and McLaurin20 
and ultimately set the premise for the explicit overturn of the Plessy decision in 
Brown. 
The following section will discuss Supreme Court of the United States cases 
that are related to the use of affirmative action in higher education. Missouri ex rel. 
Gaines, Sipuel ,Sweatt, and McLaurin  are the cases that shaped pre-affirmative 
action higher education policies before the Brown decision. We will follow this 
discussion with an overview of affirmative action cases that the Court heard after 
Brown: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Hopwood v. Texas, Gratz 
v. Bollinger, Grutter v. Bollinger, and Fisher v. University of Texas. 
The University of Missouri Law School denied a Black student by the name of 
Lloyd Gaines admission under the purported auspices of a Missouri state law ban-
ning Black students from attending law school in the State of Missouri.21 While 
Gaines graduated from his alma mater, Lincoln University, an HBCU located in 
Jefferson City, Missouri, with stellar credentials, there was no established school of 
law in the state for Black students to attend.22 The State of Missouri so strongly felt 
the need to keep the law school all white that the state offered to pay for Gaines’s 
 _________________________  
 13. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 14. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 15. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
 16. Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okl., 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
 17. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 18. McLaurin v. Okl. State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
 19. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635. 
 20. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638. 
 21. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 343 (1938).  
 22. Id. at 342. 
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law school tuition if he chose to attend a nearby state’s school.23 The Supreme 
Court of the United States turned back the law school’s actions, ruling that the 
University of Missouri’s law school must offer admission to Gaines.24 The Su-
preme Court of the United States stated that the State of Missouri has an obligation 
to “provide [Black students] with advantages for higher education substantially 
equal to the advantages afforded to white students.”25 The Gaines decision is sig-
nificant because it marked the beginning of the Court’s reconsideration of Plessy. 
While it did not explicitly overturn the separate but equal doctrine, Chief Justice 
Hughes’s opinion discusses how states can not offer only one institution of higher 
learning that focuses on a specific field and deny admission to Black students.26 
A decade later, the Supreme Court of the United States would rebuke the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma’s law school in a case with issues similar to those presented in 
Gaines.27 In the case of Sipuel, Ada Sipuel applied to the University of Oklahoma’s 
law school, the only public law school in the state, and the law school denied her 
application for admission based solely on her race.28 The Supreme Court of the 
United States would, once again, have to instruct white people that state statutes 
and higher education admission policy could not discriminate against Black stu-
dents if the state offered only one institution dedicated to a particular field of study 
for its citizens.29 A unanimous Supreme Court of the United States ruled in favor of 
Sipuel, stating that she must be admitted into the University of Oklahoma.30 
Next, Oklahoma’s southern neighbor, Texas, would attempt to scheme its way 
to masking apparent racism in higher education. Heman Marion Sweatt, a black 
man who worked for the United States Postal Service, and five other Black pro-
spective students filed suit against the University of Texas Law School due to the 
law school’s  policy and state’s constitutional policy that actively precluded Black 
people from admission into or enrollment at the law school.31 Sweatt intended to 
challenge the Texas Constitution, which stated that the law school was reserved for 
the education of white students only.32 In a ploy to appease Sweatt and other Black 
students interested in pursuing law degrees, Texas’s all-white male legislative body 
allowed for the creation of a separate Black law school which would ultimately 
become the Thurgood Marshall School of Law housed at Texas Southern Universi-
ty, an HBCU located in Houston, Texas. Black prospective law students were to 
travel to an institution for Black students over a hundred miles away from the 
 _________________________  
 23. Id. at 342–43. 
 24. Id. at 352 (reversing the decision of the supreme court of Missouri and remanding the case for proceed-
ings consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision). 
 25. Id. at 344. 
 26. See generally id.  
 27. Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okl., 332 U.S. 631, 631 (1948). 
 28. Id. at 632. 
 29. Id. at 632–33. 
 30. Id. at 633. 
 31. Thomas D. Russell, The Shape of the Michigan River as Viewed from the Land of Sweatt v. Painter and  
Hopwood, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 507, 507 (2000). 
 32. William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access From Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African American, 
Latino, and  
American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950–2000, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 1, 4 (2003). 
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state’s all-white law school that enjoyed overwhelming support.33 Although the 
white Texas legislature presumed that the Black law school fell under the parame-
ters of the separate but equal doctrine, the inequalities faced at the Black law 
school were too disproportionate for the Supreme Court of the United States to 
ignore. According to Sweatt,34 Texas Southern’s law school “only had five full-
time professors, 23 students, a library of 16,500 volumes, a practice court, a legal 
aid association, and one alumnus admitted to the Texas bar” whereas “the Univer-
sity of Texas’ law school had 16 full-time and three part-time professors, 850 stu-
dents, a library of 65,000 volumes, a law review, moot court facilities, scholarship 
funds, an order of the Coif affiliation, distinguished alumni, tradition, and pres-
tige.”35  
Lawmakers in Texas must have somehow thought that the Thurgood Marshall 
School of Law, which was dedicated exclusively to the legal education of Black 
students and had only been established four years prior to the Supreme Court of the 
United States’s decision in Sweatt, could have had the opportunity to acquire the 
same prestige as the all-white institution that had been established for decades. One 
must consider how the Texas lawmakers could have reached this conclusion when 
the newly minted Thurgood Marshall School of Law was founded in and operated 
under an anti-black atmosphere. Not surprisingly, that white people managed to 
deny admission to the University of Texas Law School to Black students and ulti-
mately built an entirely new law school to accommodate Black students interested 
in law (while maintaining the all-white population of the University of Texas Law 
School) did not please the Supreme Court of the United States.36 The Supreme 
Court of the United States found the apparent inequities and the facial denial of 
Black students’ applications to the University of Texas Law School impermissible 
under the U.S. Constitution.37 Furthermore, the establishment of the Thurgood 
Marshall School of Law assisted the outcome of the ruling, highlighting how des-
perate white people were to avoid the equitable treatment of Black people.38 More-
over, the Court reasoned that it was necessary to desegregate legal education, stat-
ing:  
Although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well aware 
that it is an intensely practical one. The law school, the proving 
ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isola-
tion from the individuals and institutions with which the law inter-
acts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose 
 _________________________  
 33. Id. at 3. 
 34. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 35. Id. at 632–33. 
 36. Id. at 636 (reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas and remanding the case for proceed-
ings consistent with the Supreme Court of the United States’s decision). 
 37. Id. at 635. 
 38. Id. at 631–32 (discussing the elaborate pathway by which the State of Texas employed delay and dis-
guise to build an all-black law school, effectively avoiding the mixing of races at the University of Texas’ Law 
School). 
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to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of 
ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.39  
It goes without saying that the previous Missouri ex. rel. Gaines and Sipuel de-
cisions impacted the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the Sweatt case. 
It was not long before the State of Oklahoma would again try its hand at racial 
segregation and the exclusion of Black people in graduate and professional school. 
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, the University of Oklahoma admitted 
George McLaurin into its graduate education program.40 On his first attempt to 
seek admission, the University denied McLaurin admission based on an Oklahoma 
state law that made it illegal for Black and white students to receive educational 
services together.41 The U.S. district court held the University of Oklahoma’s ac-
tions violated McLaurin’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.42 According to McLau-
rin, the State of Oklahoma passed a law granting the education of Black and white 
students at the same institutions if such programs were not offered at Black institu-
tions so long as the provision of educational services was offered in a segregated 
manner.43 Such a law resembles what the Supreme Court of the United States pre-
viously stated was illegal in the Sweatt decision.44 As a result of this new law, the 
University of Oklahoma chose to humiliate McLaurin by only allowing him to sit 
at a certain table in the cafeteria, although he could not eat lunch at the same time 
as white students, and to sit at a specific desk outside of class during lectures and in 
the library.45 The University of Oklahoma provided its own rendition of separate 
but equal. In Chief Justice Vinson’s opinion, he stated, “Our society grows increas-
ingly complex, and our need for trained leaders increases correspondingly.”46 The 
University was ordered to cease the separate conditions imposed on McLaurin.47 
Affirmative Action Court Cases Post-Brown 
Beginning with the decision in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,48 the Supreme Court of the United States’s embrace of the diversity ra-
tionale of affirmative action has become problematic for Black people due to its 
reproduction of anti-black higher education admissions policies. According to Amy 
Stuart Wells and colleagues, “Instead of supporting a racial equality goal in this 
case, the [Supreme] Court relied almost solely on the diversity rationale when up-
holding the limited use of racial classifications in higher education admissions pol-
 _________________________  
 39. Id. at 634. 
 40. McLaurin v. Okl. State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637, 639–40 (1950). 
 41. Id. at 638. 
 42. Id. at 639. 
 43. Id.  
 44. See generally Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 45. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640. 
 46. Id. at 641. 
 47. Id. at 642 (concluding that the conditions under which George McLaurin received his education were a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution). 
 48. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
7
and : 3. 57-86 McLain & Nelson
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2019
90 Barry Law Review Vol. 24 No. 2 
 
icies.”49 Moreover, the Bakke decision marked the shift from affirmative action as a 
remedy for past historical discrimination to the promotion of diversity.50  
Alan Bakke, a white student, applied to the University of California’s medical 
school in Davis, California.51 Due to the medical school’s attempt to address its 
small number of students from underrepresented populations, the institution had a 
separate admissions process for underrepresented minority students.52 After being 
denied admission on two occasions, Bakke filed suit against the medical school 
claiming that the admissions policies were discriminatory and his test scores alone 
should be grounds for admission.53 Although Bakke’s admission test scores were 
considered high, his academic performance and campus interviews gave the admis-
sions committee pause, suggesting that he may not be the best fit for matriculation 
into their program.54 In summary, a white male felt discriminated against because, 
regardless of what minority applicants possessed, his test scores alone were superi-
or.55 That the medical school offered admission to a student from a marginalized 
group was unacceptable to Bakke.56 The Supreme Court of the United States 
agreed with Alan Bakke, ruling that utilizing racial quotas in admissions policies 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.57 The Court, thereafter, sanctioned colleges’ 
and universities’ efforts to promote diversity on their respective campuses, rather 
than colleges’ and universities’ efforts to offer relief from the systemic oppression 
that peoples of color encountered daily, which, in turn, impacted the ability of peo-
ples of color to achieve admission into the most competitive state-sponsored col-
leges and universities.58 
The Bakke decision effectively rendered three results. Firstly, the right to ad-
mission into higher education was given to white students over minority students.59 
Secondly, “the Court rejected the use of race-conscious preferences as a means of 
remedying past societal racial discrimination” in all but the most limited circum-
stances.60 This is exemplified through Justice Powell’s claim that remedying injus-
tices rested on an “amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach 
into the past.”61 Thirdly, Black applicants would have to be superb, almost beyond 
reproach and with impeccable applications, in the admissions process by satisfying 
both objective and subjective criteria, yet white applicants could be mediocre and 
 _________________________  
 49. Amy Stuart Wells, Jacquelyn Duran, & Terrenda White, Refusing to Leave Desegregation Behind: 
From Graduates of Racially Diverse Schools to the Supreme Court, 110 TCHR. C. REC. 2532, 2539 (2008). 
 50. Marlo Goldstein Hode & Rebecca J. Meisenbach, Reproducing Whiteness Through Diversity: A Criti-
cal Discourse Analysis of the Pro-Affirmative Action Amicus Briefs in the Fisher Case, 10 J. DIVERSITY  
HIGHER EDUC. 162, 163 (2017). 
 51. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276. 
 52. Id. at 272–73. 
 53. Nelson, supra note 8, at 311–12. 
 54. Id. at 311. 
 55. Id. at 312. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 (1977). 
 58. Id. at 321–24 (highlighting the Harvard diversity program as an idyllic state interest in the context of 
higher education). 
 59. Nelson, supra note 8, at 314. 
 60. Wells, supra note 49, at 2539. 
 61. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
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choose which criteria to satisfy in the admissions process.62 Allowing white appli-
cants to have so much flexibility screams white privilege.63 Assuming that white 
applicants are inherently better prepared and more qualified than Black applicants 
is the crux of white supremacy.64 Pre-Brown, the Court repeatedly highlighted the 
importance of creating opportunities for Black students at the graduate and profes-
sional level.65 Ironically, the Supreme Court of the United States, less than 30 years 
after the decisions in Sweatt and McLaurin, had already determined that institutions 
of higher education must have become more inclusive and the need to create access 
for black applicants was no longer a priority.66 
Nearly two decades later, race-based admissions policies would again come 
under question. Cheryl Hopwood and three other white applicants applied to the 
University of Texas Law School, but based on the law school’s admission policy 
that favored a certain number of minority students, Hopwood and the other three 
applicants were denied admission.67 Hopwood argued that she was better qualified 
than students from marginalized communities who received affirmative admissions 
decisions, citing that her law school admission test scores and grade point average 
were higher than most of the minority students who were admitted over her.68 
Hopwood and her co-racists filed suit alleging that the affirmative action admission 
policy favored minority students and was discriminatory, violating the U.S. Consti-
tution.69 The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and prohibited the use of 
race in admissions policies.70 Hopwood resulted in higher education admission 
reform and the need for colleges and universities to address diversity on its cam-
puses.71 The Supreme Court of the United States would overturn Hopwood less 
than a decade after the Fifth Circuit rendered its opinion on the case.72  
 _________________________  
 62. Nelson, supra note 8 at 323. 
 63. For a definition of white privilege, see Jason Swanson & Anjale Welton, When Good Intentions Only 
Go So Far: White Principals Leading Discussions About Race, 53 URB. EDUC. 1, 6 (2018) (explaining that a 
component of white privilege is having the ability to be un-raced). 
 64. For a definition of white supremacy, see Ricky Lee Allen & Daniel D. Diou, Managing Whiteness: The 
Call for Educational Leadership to Breach the Contractual Expectations of White Supremacy, 53 URB. EDUC. 1, 2 
(2018) (suggesting that white supremacy is a social system that, despite the appearance of racial progress, ensures 
that white people maintain control and higher statuses than people of color).  
 65. See supra notes 21–47. 
 66. Of course, much was happening in the racial politics of the Supreme Court of the United States. Im-
portant to this analysis is that the Supreme Court of the United States found itself increasingly addressing race and 
racism outside of the U.S. South, which was presumed to be the epicenter of racial bigotry in the United States. 
Quite frankly, race and racism was an issue of the U.S. South rather than a national issue. For more information on 
this topic, see DAVISON DOUGLAS, JIM CROW MOVES NORTH: THE BATTLE OVER NORTHERN SCHOOL 
SEGREGATION, 1865–1954 (2d ed. 2012). 
 67. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 68. Id. at 935–38. 
 69. Id. at 938. 
 70. Id. at 962. 
 71. Sandra E. Black, Kalena E. Cortez, & Jane Arnold Lincove, Efficacy Versus Equality: What Happens 
When States Tinker with College Admissions in a Race-Blind Era?, 38 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS  
336, 338 (2016).  
 72. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). The Supreme 
Court of the United States decided both cases pertaining to the use of affirmative action admissions policies at the 
University of Michigan in 2003. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Hopwood in 1996. 
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In 2003 the Supreme Court of the United States heard two cases involving the 
University of Michigan’s affirmative action based admissions policies—Grutter v. 
Bollinger73 and Gratz v. Bollinger.74 In Grutter, Barbara Grutter, yet another white 
applicant who felt that she had the right to be admitted into a traditionally white 
institution over her minority counterparts despite not explicitly arguing that her 
academic credentials were markedly better than her black and brown counterparts, 
filed suit against the University of Michigan Law School after being denied admis-
sion.75 The law school used race in its admissions policies as part of a holistic re-
view of all applicants.76 The law school claimed that due to a compelling interest to 
achieve diversity, its policies were necessary.77 This argument coincides with the 
beneficial effects that racial and ethnic diversity play in a diverse world.78 The Su-
preme Court of the United States, claiming that student body diversity is important, 
agreed with the law school by opining that as long as the means of achieving diver-
sity is narrowly tailored, both race and ethnicity may be considered as part of the 
law school’s admissions policies.79 The Supreme Court of the United States’s deci-
sion in Grutter also reiterated the need for the use of strict scrutiny, just as the Su-
preme Court of the United States set forth in Bakke.80  
The early 2000s are the most obvious instance of when the interests of white 
people converge with the benefits of diversity. On the contrary, when the Universi-
ty of Michigan denied Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher admission into their 
undergraduate programs, the Supreme Court of United States ruled that the Univer-
sity’s use of racial preferences violated both the Equal Protection Clause and Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 because the race-based policies were not “narrowly tailored.”81 
The undergraduate admissions process differed from the law school’s admissions 
practices.82 During the law school’s process, candidates were admitted after a holis-
tic review that included race as a component.83 At the undergraduate level, appli-
cants from marginalized racial and ethnic backgrounds were offered 20 points on a 
scale on which 100 points guaranteed admission into the university.84 This process 
resulted in practically all students from racial or ethnically marginalized communi-
ties receiving positive admissions decisions.85 The University’s undergraduate ad-
 _________________________  
 73. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316–17. 
 74. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244.  
 75. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316–17, 327–28. 
 76. Id. at 337 (expounding upon the admissions process that the University of Michigan Law School em-
ploys). 
 77. Id. at 329 (stating that the law school sought to construct incoming classes that contained a critical 
mass of minority students). 
 78. Liliana M. Garces, Understanding the Impact of Affirmative Action Bans in Different Graduate Fields 
of Study,  
50 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 251, 252 (2013). 
 79. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333–34. Although we note that Justice O’Connor suggests that the Supreme Court 
of the United States suspects there will be no need for affirmative action a quarter century after the Court’s deci-
sion in Grutter. Id. at 343. 
 80. Id. at 333–34. 
 81. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) 
 82. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255. 
 85. Id. at 272. 
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mission process and its practice of admitting applicants just because they were 
from an underrepresented minority ran afoul of the U.S. Constitution.86  
Since rendering decisions in Gratz and Grutter, the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States has entertained the case of Fisher v. University of Texas,87 the most recent 
case pertaining to the actual use of affirmative action policies.88 Not even a genera-
tion after the Supreme Court of the United States’s sanctioning of the use of race in 
the Michigan affirmative action cases, Fisher threatened to end affirmative action 
policies at the urging of a disgruntled white applicant who was denied admission 
into a university.89 Abigail Fisher applied to the University of Texas at Austin and 
was denied admission.90 It is important to note that UT Austin automatically admit-
ted all students who graduated within the top 10% of their graduating class from 
Texas high schools.91 Abigail Fisher did not graduate in the top 10% of her class; 
therefore, she had to take her chances in the general admission pool with thousands 
of other applicants.92 The alternative path to admission into the University of Texas 
at Austin is considerably more competitive than the process which automatically 
admitted students enjoy.93 Although she had several bites at the proverbial apple, 
Abigail Fisher’s academic qualifications were insufficient, inadequate, and non-
competitive against the more competitive pool of applicants; thus, the University of 
Texas at Austin denied Fisher’s bid for admission.94 Fisher then claimed that the 
University of Texas at Austin favored Black and other underrepresented students in 
the admission process, arguing that these students took her place at the competitive 
state university.95  
Fisher’s argument failed to acknowledge that white applicants dominated the 
population of admitted students in both the automatic and secondary admissions 
processes.96 Moreover, Fisher failed to acknowledge that few, if any, admittees, the 
majority of whom were white, shared her underwhelming academic credentials.97 
The University, for its part, claimed that it was merely trying to achieve a diverse 
campus through narrowly tailored means.98 The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the University of Texas at Austin’s admissions procedures claiming the 
policies were in line with the requirements of Grutter.99 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of the United States required the lower court to use strict scrutiny to ensure 
 _________________________  
 86. Id. at 275–76. 
 87. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 88. We do not highlight Schuette v. BAMN; however, see Nelson, supra note 8 for an argument that con-
siders Schuette as part and parcel of the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. 
 89. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 323–28 (arguing that Fisher’s attack on affirmative action was, in fact, 
motivated by her attempts to protect whiteness). 
 90. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 91. Id. at 2218. 
 92. Id. at 2207. 
 93. Nelson, supra note 8, at 322–23. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 320. 
 96. Id. at 325. 
 97. Id. at 323. 
 98. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
 99. Id. 
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the University of Texas at Austin’s admission processes were constitutional; again, 
the University’s policies were found constitutional.100  
As a result of Fisher, higher education affirmative action survived yet another 
white person’s attempt to end it. However, the policy had become watered down, 
stripped of its social justice component, which focused on addressing historical 
wrongs imposed on Black and Brown people, and diversity had become the prima-
ry focus.101 Fisher exemplifies how white America can challenge any attempt to 
favor underrepresented minorities in the college admissions process even if their 
claims are nothing more than confusion about how a minority can ever be favored 
over them.102 The diversity rationale of affirmative action has become a problem 
for Black people.  
III.  ANTIBLACKNESS AND THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE 
Just as critical race theory asserts that racism is ingrained into the fabric of the 
United States and our global society, antiblackness is woven into the national and 
global structures that impact Black people.103 Michael J. Dumas, scholar of race 
and education at the University of California, Berkeley, describes antiblackness as 
how society views Black people as something other than human and articulates that 
slavery, which dehumanized Black people by treating Black people as chattel prop-
erty, continues to be identified with Black people.104 The struggles of Black people 
are seen as trivial in the eyes of white supremacist people and structures and are 
only considered worthy of attention if the interest of white people is benefitted. 
Antiblackness explains why resisting the diversity rationale (as well as multicultur-
alism) is a social justice issue as it relates to Black people.105 Without parsing 
words, diversity is antiblack. Lawrence Blum further explains that diversity, “sev-
ered from any corrective justice,” does not “explain why race should be privileged 
among other forms of diversity.”106 Moreover, diversity does not see Black people 
as being capable of intragroup diversity.107 However, Black people, separate from 
other races, are already diverse because we have different religions, political ideo-
logies, sexual orientations, living situations, upbringings, and so forth.108  
Our collective oppressions at the hand of white people, whiteness, and white-
dominated society are, nevertheless, a cultural artifact, reality, and tie that binds. 
White supremacy knows the worth of Black people, and by defining diversity by 
the colonizer’s standards, whiteness fails to take into account the differences within 
 _________________________  
 100. Id. at 2215. 
 101. To be clear, diversity became the focus of affirmative action policies in Bakke. 
 102. Nelson, supra note 8, at 319–28. 
 103. T. Elon Dancy II, Kirsten T. Edwards, & James Earl Davis, Historically White Institutions and Planta-
tion Politics: Anti-Blackness and Higher Education in the Black Lives Matter Era, 53 URB. EDUC. 176, 179 (2018). 
 104. Michael J. Dumas, Against the Dark: Antiblackness in Education Policy and Discourse, 55 THEORY 
INTO PRACTICE 11, 13 (2016). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Lawrence Blum, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and Racial Justice: Reflections from a Diverse, Non-
Elite University, 14 THEORY & RES. EDUC. 348, 351 (2016). 
 107. Nelson, supra note 8, at 326–27. 
 108. Blum, supra note 106, at 351–52. 
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the blackness.109 The diversity rationale, as implemented by the white masses, aims 
to erase Black suffering by choosing to focus on the individual rather than our 
group experience.110 This explains white people’s increased need to claim and pur-
sue diversity. As long as white people can boast and define the parameters of the 
term, they own it. What cannot be forgotten is that racial identities are a product of 
white supremacist ideology.111 Moreover, Black people and, to that extent, diversi-
ty are under attack by whiteness.  
As our American society grows less white, white people have colonized the 
term diversity. It is now being used as a co-opting tool to promote colorblind ideo-
logies.112 As the Supreme Court of the United States’s embrace on diversity grows 
tighter, diversity as acknowledged in traditionally white institutions as colorblind-
ness remains at the core of American educational culture.113 This is true in instanc-
es of white people’s efforts at overt racism and more broadly, liberal white agendas 
that embrace abstract liberalism, or the notion that one can espouse liberal ideolo-
gies while rejecting any and all concrete applications of those same liberal ideolo-
gies.114 As discussed in the previous section, in a pre-Brown society diversity was 
frowned upon—Ada Sipuel of Oklahoma and countless others lived a harsh reality 
where they had to fight for even the most basic concepts of equality. Today, as 
long as diversity can be used by white supremacy to exploit Black people, it is and 
will be celebrated. White ideology, or whiteness, specifically as applied to educa-
tion policy, remains a tool for whites to oppress Black people.115 
Furthermore, Black students are wanted at traditionally white institutions so 
that the schools may fulfill abstractly liberal criteria for obtaining and retaining 
diverse student populations where the interests of white people are prioritized, 
promoted, and achieved. Simultaneously, however, the interests of Black students 
are marginalized, shunted, or otherwise ignored. Diversity without social justice on 
college campuses, as seen through whiteness as a critical theory, is a diluted term 
meant to maintain rather than transform organizational norms and values that have 
kept systemic inequalities strong.116 The United States’s traditionally white institu-
 _________________________  
 109. Id. at 351. 
 110. See generally Michael J. Dumas, ‘Losing an Arm’: Schooling as a Site of Black Suffering, 17 RACE 
ETHNICITY & EDUC. 1 (2014) (describing schools as a site of collective social struggle and strife for black people 
in the United States). 
 111. Goldstein Hode, supra note 50, at 171. 
 112. Glasener, supra note 6, at 3. 
 113. Vue, supra note 11, at 869. 
 114. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 76 (5th ed. 2017) (defining and applying the 
concept of abstract liberalism). 
 115. See generally David Gillborn, Education Policy as an Act of White Supremacy: Whiteness, Critical 
Race Theory, and Education Reform, 20 J. EDUC. POL’Y 485 (2005); see also Steven L. Nelson, Racial Subjuga-
tion by Another Name? Using the Links in the School-to-Prison Pipeline to Reassess State Takeover District 
Performance, 9 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 1 (2017); Steven L. Nelson, Could the State Takeover of 
Public Schools Create a State-Created Danger? Theorizing at the Intersection of State Takeover Districts, the 
School-to-Prison Pipeline, and Racial Oppression, 27 NAT. BLACK. L.J. 1 (2018); Steven L. Nelson & Heather N. 
Bennett, Are Black Parents Locked Out of Challenging Disproportionately Low Charter School Board Represen-
tation: Assessing the Role of the Federal Courts in Building a House of Cards, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 153 (2016) (arguing that state policies requiring the reconstitution of schools and school districts result in 
the racial subjugation of black students, parents, and communities). 
 116. Glasener, supra note 6, at 6. 
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tions have adopted the business case for diversity model.117 According to Gold-
stein, Hode, and Meisenbach, the business case for diversity is how corporate 
America saw increased diversity as a way to use minorities to achieve advantages 
in a global marketplace.118 If Black students wanted access to selective and highly 
selective colleges, this meant that white students could benefit and be prepared to 
compete in the global marketplace. Non-white, racialized identities, therefore, be-
come the property of whiteness.119 As white people continue to battle between op-
posing affirmative action as a tool for the restitution and reparation of Black people 
and embrace diversity as a benefit to white interests, a specific group of colleges 
and universities stand to benefit—HBCUs.  
The Ayers Case: A Case Study of the Antiblackness of Affirmative Action 
In the decades that followed Brown, many educational entities took advantage 
of the Supreme Court of the United States’s all but deliberate speed decree. School 
districts and public colleges and universities schemed to thwart desegregation ef-
forts, and the State of Mississippi’s very own higher education governing board 
was no different.120 As evidence of our previous statement, by the middle of the 
twentieth century, eight institutions of higher education served the State of Missis-






















 _________________________  
 117. Id. at 8. 
 118. Goldstein Hode, supra note 50, at 164. 
 119. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1742 (1992). 
 120. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (D. Miss. 1987). 
14
Barry Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol24/iss2/3





Year Established Location 
The University of 
Mississippi 
1844 Oxford, MS 
Alcorn State Univer-
sity (Originally Alcorn 
College) 




and Mechanical College) 
1878 Starkville, MS 
Mississippi Universi-
ty for Women  
(Originally the Industrial 
Institute and College) 
1884 Columbus, MS 
The University of 
Southern Mississippi  
(Originally Mississippi 
Normal College) 
1910 Hattiesburg, MS 
Delta State Universi-
ty 
(Originally Delta State 
College) 
1924 Cleveland, MS 
Jackson State Uni-
versity  
(Originally Jackson State 
College) 




Valley State College) 
1946 Itta Bena, MS 
 
According to Ayers v. Allain, until 1962 Black students could only attend one 
of the three historically Black universities in Mississippi: Alcorn State University, 
Jackson State University, and Mississippi Valley State University.121 Throughout 
the 1960s, Mississippi’s public universities would begin to admit students other 
than each campus’ dominant race, but differences between the state’s HBCUs and 
traditionally white institutions remained.122 The Meredith v. Fair decision allowed 
for James Meredith, a Black man, to not only become the first Black student to 
enroll at the University of Mississippi but to be the first Black student to enroll at a 
 _________________________  
 121. Id. at 1529.  
 122. Id. at 1525. 
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traditionally white institution in Mississippi.123 Once again the federal court needed 
to intervene to address an issue of racism in the admissions practices of an institu-
tion on higher education. In 1969, the U.S Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare asked the State of Mississippi to submit a plan of action detailing how the 
state would dismantle de jure segregation in its higher education system.124 How-
ever, this plan, through its multiple iterations, did not prove to address educational 
racism in Mississippi’s segregated higher education system, forcing Black Missis-
sippians to seek litigation against the State of Mississippi for violation of federal 
laws by supporting and maintaining de jure segregation in the State’s institutions of 
higher education. 
In 1975, James Ayers and other Black Mississippians filed a class-action suit 
alleging that Mississippi and its higher education governing board, known as the 
Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, maintained a racially 
segregated system of higher education.125 The Ayers litigation proceeded for over 
twenty-five years, and its remnants can be felt today at Alcorn State University, 
Jackson State University, and Mississippi Valley State University.126 There are 
three reasons why the various iterations of Ayers exhibit antiblackness. Firstly, the 
time taken for the original case to go to trial coupled with following years of retrial 
allowed for white people to set the pace of remedy, which is  similar to desegrega-
tion efforts post-Brown.127 Also, certain ramifications of the litigation, such as the 
standardized admission policy, unfairly and disproportionately disadvantaged 
HBCUs. Furthermore, although white people in Mississippi, specifically those in 
charge of the state’s institutions of higher education, were the alleged racists, 
HBCUs could only receive the majority of funding resulting from the Ayers settle-
ment if white students occupied ten percent of the enrollment of each respective 
HBCU.  
Months after the original filing in which the plaintiffs called out the State of 
Mississippi and its higher education governing board for violating the Fifth, Ninth, 
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as civil rights legislation, the 
United States intervened as a plaintiff in the Ayers Case.128 Instead of going to trial, 
a majority white male state legislature and governing board were given the oppor-
tunity to remedy their wrongs, leading to the creation of mission statements distin-
guishing the purpose of each public university in the state, and the State, thereafter, 
claimed that it had eradicated laws pertaining to race and higher education admis-
 _________________________  
 123. Id. at 1529. 
 124. Molly L. Mitchell, A Settlement of Ayers v. Musgrove: Is Mississippi Moving Towards Desegregation 
in Higher Education or Merely a Separate But ‘More Equal’ System, 71 MISS. L.J. 1011, 1013 (2002). 
 125. Id. at 1011. 
 126. Laurence Parker, From Brown to Ayers v. Fordice: The Changing Shape of Racial Desegregation in 
U.S. Higher Education, 13 J. EDUC. POL’Y 669, 701 (1998). 
 127. See generally Steven L. Nelson & Alison C. Tyler, Examining Pennsylvania Human Relations Com-
mission v. School District of Philadelphia: Considering How the Supreme Court’s Waning Support of School 
Desegregation Affected Desegregation Efforts Based on State Law, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1040 (2017) (discuss-
ing how the Supreme Court of the United States’ delay tactics, a result of its waning support, allowed for white 
people to resist desegregation and ultimately led to the end results of a civil rights lawsuit looking dissimilar to the 
plaintiffs’ initial request for relief). 
 128. Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1524. 
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sion.129 Twelve years after the original filing, the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Mississippi finally heard the case and referenced two previous cas-
es—Bazemore v. Friday,130 which considered student choice and Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County,131 a case pertaining to eradicating policies that 
upheld segregated education.132 Based on these previous cases, along with the 
State’s claim that it removed segregative laws coupled with the court’s claim that 
students had freedom to choose the university of choice, the Mississippi District 
Court ruled in favor of the State and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that 
decision.133  
However, the Supreme Court of the United States disagreed and asserted in 
United States v. Fordice that voluntary student choice and race-neutral laws and 
admission policies do not abolish segregated higher education systems. 134 The Su-
preme Court of the United States, moreover, found four policies that were remnants 
of de jure segregation in institutions of higher education in Mississippi.135 The first 
policy dealt with admission policies that excluded Black students from predomi-
nately white institutions (PWI).136 The second policy pertained to the missions of 
the eight public universities.137 While the University of Mississippi, Mississippi 
State University, and the University of Southern Mississippi were all designated as 
comprehensive universities, no state HBCU held the designation as a comprehen-
sive university, a de facto limitation on the resources that Black universities re-
ceived.138 Thirdly, the number of duplicated programs between the HBCUs and 
PWIs continued de jure segregation.139 Fourthly, the Court questioned the need for 
eight public universities in the state.140 The Supreme Court of the United States 
sent the case back to lower courts.141 
However, two problematic assertions come from Fordice. The first is, upon 
remand to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the lower court ruled that a standard 
admission policy for Mississippi’s eight public universities was necessary.142 How-
ever, such a change would drastically affect Black student’s access to higher edu-
cation within the state.143 It would also lead to increased competition between the 
 _________________________  
 129. John Michael Lee, Jr., United States v. Fordice: Mississippi Higher Education Without Public Histori-
cally Black Colleges and Universities, 79 J. NEGRO EDUC. 166, 168 (2010); see also, Mitchell, supra note 124, at 
1015. 
 130. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986). 
 131. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 132. Lee, supra note 129, at 168. 
 133. Id.; see also, Mitchell, supra note 124, at 1017. 
 134. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992). 
 135. Id. at 733. 
 136. Id. at 733–38. 
 137. Id. at 739–41. 
 138. Id. at 740. 
 139. Id. at 738–39. 
 140. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 741–42. 
 141. Id. at 743. To our overarching point, the Supreme Court rejected the idea of creating black enclaves 
that would presumably be free of harassment and racism at the hands of white people. 
 142. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1481 (N.D. Miss. 1995). 
 143. Id. 
17
and : 3. 57-86 McLain & Nelson
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2019
100 Barry Law Review Vol. 24 No. 2 
 
HBCUs and PWIs, competition that HBCUs could neither afford nor win.144 Mis-
sissippi HBCUs catered to underserved populations, and continue to do so, and 
attempts to alter admission policies did not benefit that population.145 Black stu-
dents would also stand to lose from the change, and it would have a negative effect 
on Black Mississippians’ finances, job placement rates, and well-being. Once 
again, Black citizens were to receive the short end of the stick in a matter in which 
the original aim was to reprimand a racist higher education system.  
In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States claimed that Mississippi 
had too many public universities given its population size and economic makeup.146 
The logical next step to this argument was that HBCUs had outlived their pre-
Brown purposes.147 Such an assertion reproduces whiteness for it claims that 
HBCUs are no longer needed. Moreover, this argument suggests, incorrectly, that 
traditionally white institutions can or will accommodate Black students’ individual 
and collective cultures in the same ways that (or perhaps better than) HBCUs ac-
commodate the interests of Black students. Just as white people challenged af-
firmative action, prompting changes in the intent and impact of such policies not 
even three full decades after the policies’ enactments, the Supreme Court of the 
United States put forth the idea that any successful institution aimed at sustaining 
the culture or collective interests of Black peoples should be eliminated. If the Su-
preme Court of the United States found remnants of de jure segregation, it should 
have been apparent that many Black Mississippi students only had three choices 
within the state and eliminating either Alcorn State University, Jackson State Uni-
versity, or Mississippi Valley State University would have grave consequences for 
the Black community.  
Shortly after the beginning of the twenty-first century, the parties in the Ayers 
case reached a settlement.148 Attempts at settlement were unsuccessful in the early 
to mid-1980s and the early and later 1990s.149 The agreed upon settlement consists 
of $503 million that will be paid to Mississippi’s HBCUs until 2022, of which 
$245 million has gone towards academic programs, $75 million to capital im-
provements, $55 million in public endowment funds, $35 million in private en-
dowment funds (a fund of which the Mississippi higher education board of trustees 
has failed to raise), and $83 million toward case-related fees.150 To remain in the 
scope of this paper, we only focus on three major actions that have come from this 
settlement. While a number of academic programs—bachelor’s, master’s, and doc-
toral—were added to the three public Mississippi HBCUs, these programs are du-
plicates of what were already established at the state’s traditionally white institu-
tions.151 The result of the Ayers case was that HBCUs saw their academic offerings 
 _________________________  
 144. Lee, supra note 129, at 169. 
 145. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 at 741–42.  
 146. Id. at 742 (suggesting that the closure of some schools might alleviate the State of Mississippi’s dis-
criminatory admissions policies). 
 147. Mitchell, supra note 124, at 1019. 
 148. Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.; see also, Mitchell, supra note 124, at 1019. 
 151. Thompson, 358 F.3d at 361.  
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expanded and bolstered, but traditionally white institutions held on to nearly all of 
their academic programs.152 Also, Jackson State University’s designation changed 
from an urban university to a comprehensive university; the board did not change 
Jackson State University’s mission statement nor did the HBCU receive the same 
amount of funding for its comprehensive status unlike the comprehensive, tradi-
tionally white institutions in the state.153 Worst of all, Mississippi’s HBCUs faced 
requirements to recruit and retain a student body that is at least 10% white for at 
least three consecutive years.154 Also, Alcorn State University, Jackson State Uni-
versity, and Mississippi Valley State University were to use other-race marketing 
and recruitment, employ other-race recruiting staff, and award other-race student 
scholarships.155 The Ayers settlement funding depended on these other-race re-
quirements.156 White people stood to benefit from their historical and contemporary 
bigoted actions, and these benefits accrued at the expense of Mississippi HBCUs.   
History indeed repeated itself in the Ayers litigation. The Supreme Court of the 
United States’ lack of guidance and the State of Mississippi’s lack of urgency (or 
simple will to act) resulted in the outcomes of Ayers repeating the outcomes of 
Brown; when all was said and done, more was said than done, with the exception 
of positive outcomes for white people. For comparison’s sake, we offer the follow-
ing points. Firstly, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that “separate but 
equal” was unconstitutional and American schools had to desegregate.157 Secondly, 
in lieu of establishing a timeframe for states to desegregate public education, the 
Supreme Court of the United States vaguely let the interest of white people domi-
nate by stating that desegregation would occur with “all deliberate speed”158 and, 
more importantly, that desegregation would move at a pace that would not disrupt 
the public’s expectations.159 Ultimately, the federal government allowed the issues 
in the Ayers case to linger until the plaintiffs and other watchdogs tired, allowing 
for the end results to hardly resemble the original requests for relief.160 The Ayers 
litigation mirrored, in many ways, the federal government’s double talk on deseg-
regation. In all, the Supreme Court of the United States appears to come to the de-
fense of Black Mississippians by calling out Mississippi’s segregated higher educa-
tion system, yet its implications negatively affected Mississippi’s Black universi-
ties and allowed for white people to determine how long the litigation would pro-
ceed as well as the length of time to reach a settlement. The interests of white peo-
ple were repeatedly courted and privileged. 
 _________________________  
 152. Id. 
 153. Mitchell, supra note 124, at 1021. 
 154. Thompson, 358 F.3d at 366. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 158. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 159. Id. at 300. The Court ordered that the desegregation of public schools should occur at a pace that is 
acceptable for public and private interests. Moreover, the Court suggested that the desegregation should happen as 
soon as practicable, suggesting that immediacy was not of the Court’s utmost concern. 
 160. See Nelson, supra note 127 (explaining how a desegregation case ended without any focus on desegre-
gation). 
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IV. THE INTEREST CONVERGENCE THESIS AND THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
DEBATE 
The decision in Brown v. Board of Education was a radical break from the Su-
preme Court of the United States’s history of denying Black children access to the 
better-supported schools that white students attended. Indeed, Professor Derrick 
Bell asserted that the Supreme Court of the United States’s decision in Brown was 
most motivated by the United States’ need for credibility in the fight against com-
munism.161 Furthermore, Brown maintained the illusion of potential for Black sol-
diers returning from World War II.162 Finally, the Brown decision paved the way 
for the industrialization of the South.163 Aside from Professor Bell’s critique, other 
scholars have argued that the Brown decision rested on inadequate and conflicting 
social science data rather than the principle that racial segregation was inherently a 
denial of equality for Black people who are the targets of state-sponsored segrega-
tion.164 Despite these critiques, Brown has become a linchpin for Black litigants 
(and others) pursuing civil rights claims. Litigants’ overreliance on and heralding 
of Brown persists although the Court’s effort to desegregate public schools and 
equalize educational opportunities and outcomes for Black students has failed.165 
The Supreme Court of the United States’s decision in Brown appears unassailable 
in contemporary academic writings. That Brown is untouchable neglects the fact 
that civil rights scholars, immediately after the Brown decision, critiqued the white 
majority’s stance on civil rights policies: mostly arguing that white people were not 
willing to sacrifice any privilege for the equality of Black people.166 
From Professor Bell’s critique of the Brown decision arose the interest conver-
gence dilemma.167 Professor Bell’s interest convergence dilemma thesis can be 
extracted from two separate passages in his 1980 article, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion and the Interest Convergence Dilemma. Professor Bell states, “The interest of 
Blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges 
with the interest of whites.”168 Bell later adds: 
It follows that the availability of fourteenth amendment protec-
tion in racial cases may not actually be determined by the character 
of harm suffered by blacks or the quantum of liability proved 
against whites. Racial remedies may instead be the outward mani-
festations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious judicial conclu-
sions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least 
 _________________________  
 161. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 518, 524–25 (1980).  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 520–21. 
 165. Id. at 518–19. 
 166. Id. at 522. See Professor Bell’s discussion of Professor Black’s response to Professor Wechsler’s cri-
tique of Brown. 
 167. See generally Bell, supra note 161. 
 168. Id. at 523. 
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not harm societal interests deemed important by middle and upper 
class whites. Racial justice—or its appearance—may, from time to 
time, be counted among the interests deemed important by the 
courts and by society’s policymakers.169 
What has happened in the years after Brown may be most important in proving 
Professor Bell to be at least somewhat accurate in his assessment of the outcomes 
in Brown. Although Brown was and is heralded for its promise of educational equi-
ty, the case and the implementation of its decision has always faced political 
pushback.170 Desegregation, the ostensible outcome of Brown at the primary and 
secondary education levels, has done little to improve the academic outcomes of 
Black students.171 Brown and its progeny have done relatively little to improve 
access to equitable educational opportunities or outcomes at the primary and sec-
ondary level of education.172 Most disappointingly, Brown and its progeny have not 
effectively desegregated public schools at the primary and secondary level. Public 
primary and secondary schools are no less segregated than they were in 1968.173 As 
early as the 1970s, cases, such as Milliken v. Bradley174, proved to be a death knell 
for desegregation policies as well as any other policies that aided in stymieing 
Brown-motivated desegregation activities. Moreover, these cases assured that supe-
rior educational opportunities would be reserved for whites.175 Research suggests 
that the rollback of efforts to desegregate public schools at the federal level im-
pacted more vigorous efforts to effectuate educational equity for Black students in 
some of the more progressive states.176 
Critical race theory, as an analytical tool, has migrated from legal studies to 
educational research.177 Much of critical race theory in education follows the appli-
 _________________________  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 519. 
 171. See generally Theodore J. Davis, Jr., The Politics of Race and Educational Disparities in Delaware’s 
Public Schools, 49 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 135 (2017) (articulating how in Delaware, a state originally party to the 
Brown lawsuits, race and racial politics continues to play a role in the diminished outcomes of black students); see 
also Nelson, supra note 127 (detailing how the politics of race influenced a civil rights case to the point where 
academic achievement was hardly an aim of the resultant consent decree). 
 172. See generally Dumas, supra note 104 (recounting the how black students are still dehumanized in 
purportedly desegregated schools post-Brown). 
 173. GARY ORFIELD, JOHN KUCSER & GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY, E PLURIBUS…SEPARATION: 
DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS (2012). For a more recent and specific study, see Ste-
phen Kotok, Brian Beabout, Steven L. Nelson, & Luis E. Rivera, A Demographic Paradox: How Public Schools in 
New Orleans Have Become More Racially Integrated and Isolated since Hurricane Katrina, EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 
(2017). 
 174. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).  
 175. Bell, supra note 161, at 526. 
 176. See generally Nelson, supra note 127 (suggesting that the Supreme Court of the United States’ lack of 
vigor in pushing the desegregation of public schools negatively impacted the state of Pennsylvania’s more pro-
gressive efforts at desegregation). 
 177. See generally Gloria Ladson-Billings, Just What is Critical Race Theory and What’s It Doing in a Nice 
Field Like Education, 11 INT’L J. QUALITATIVE STUD. EDUC. 7 (1998); Tyrone C. Howard, Who Really Cares? 
The Disenfranchisement of African American Males in PreK-12 Schools: A Critical Race Theory Perspective, 110 
TCHR. C. REC. 954 (2008) (discussing the use of critical race theory as a research methodology and analytical 
framework). But see Nolan L. Cabrera, Where is the Racial Theory in Critical Race Theory? A Constructive Criti-
cism of the Crits, 42 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 209 (2018) (arguing that the use of Critical Race Theory has been used 
primarily as an analytical framework—as is the case in legal studies—as opposed to a research methodology).  
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cation of critical race theory as an analytical tool in legal studies.178 Interest con-
vergence is a critical component or tenet of critical race theory.179 Both education 
and legal scholars have argued that interest convergence is a prominent pathway to 
practical racial progress.180 This argument seems particularly aspirational given the 
general lack of racial progress in schooling and educational systems in the United 
States (as measured by access and outcomes).181 The prominence and unassailabil-
ity of the interest convergence thesis prompted Professor Justin Driver to offer a 
critique of Professor Bell’s arguments from his 1980 article.182  
To date, Driver’s critique is the most scathing critique of the interest conver-
gence thesis. In particular, Professor Driver argues that the use of the interest con-
vergence thesis artificially limits efforts to pursue racial equity.183 Professor Driv-
er’s most notable critiques are that interest convergence ignores intragroup differ-
ences in interests, suggests that racial groups are static rather than dynamic, treats 
Black people and some white people as if they lack agency in the fight for civil 
rights, and is treated as irrefutable.184 Driver further notes that racial remedies are 
limited by the interest convergence thesis. Perhaps more tongue-in-cheek, Driver 
hints that the arguments for interest convergence as a theory has prompted a con-
spiracy theory nature in Black Americans. More troublingly, Driver’s overall con-
clusion of the article is easily read as a dismissal of Black suffering as merely a 
conspiracy theory.185 Other scholars have offered more loving critiques of the in-
terest convergence thesis. For instance, multicultural scholar and educator, Taharee 
Apirom Jackson, adds depth to Bell’s thesis, arguing that there are four distinct 
forms of interest that must be explored when assessing the convergence or diver-
gence of racial interests: material (having), emotional (feeling), psychological 
(thinking), and moral (doing).186 Likewise, Dana N. Thompson Dorsey and Terah 
T. Venzant Chambers proffer a theory of convergence, divergence, and reclamation 
in which Professor Bell’s interest convergence dilemma is coupled with Professor 
Cheryl I. Harris’s whiteness as property thesis.187 In this provocative piece, 
Thompson Dorsey and Venzant Chambers note that a second tenet of Bell’s inter-
est convergence thesis suggests that any civil rights advanced or won by Black 
 _________________________  
 178. See generally Adrienne D. Dixson & Celia K. Rousseau, And We Are Still Not Saved: Critical Race 
Theory in Education Ten Years Later, 8 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 7 (2005). 
 179. Taharee Apirom Jackson, Which Interests Are Served by the Principle of Interest Convergence? White-
ness, Collective Trauma, and the Case for Antiracism, 14 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 435, 437 (2011). 
 180. E.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome–Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology Through Interest 
Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 280 (2005); Shaun R. Harper, Race, Interest Convergence, and Transfer 
Outcomes for Black Male Student Athletes, 147 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR COMMUNITY C. 29, 31 (2009). 
 181. See generally Tyrone C. Howard & Oscar Navarro, Critical Race Theory 20 Years Later: Where Do 
We Go From Here? 51 URB. EDUC. 253 (2016); Nelson, supra note 8. 
 182. See generally Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149 
(2011). 
 183. Id. at 157. 
 184. Id. at 165–168. 
 185. Id. at 189–197. 
 186. Jackson, supra note 179, at 439. 
 187. Dana N. Thompson Dorsey & Terah T. Venzant Chambers, Growing C-D-R (Cedar): Working the 
Intersections of Interest Convergence and Whiteness as Property in the Affirmative Action Legal Debate, 17 RACE 
ETHNICITY & EDUC. 56 (2014). 
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people can be and are often abrogated when these advances threaten white suprem-
acy.188 The primary argument in convergence-divergence-reclamation (CDR) anal-
ysis suggests, therefore, that white stakeholders—at any point—envision civil 
rights for Black people;189 however, we argue that there is never benevolence and 
always malicious intent (or at least self-interest) when white stakeholders purport 
to advance Black people’s civil rights. In particular, we adopt Bell’s argument that 
white people have little or no intention or, worse, ability to imagine and compre-
hend the sacrifice they must make to make room for the pursuit of equity for Black 
people.190 
Scholars have applied the interest convergence thesis (and other tenets of criti-
cal race theory) beyond primary and secondary education.191 In the context of post-
secondary education, the lion’s share of critical race theory analyses has considered 
admissions (affirmative action) and intercollegiate athletics.192 Amy and Robert 
McCormick’s analysis of Division I athletics as interest convergence is one notable 
example.193 Despite the salience of their argument, McCormick and McCormick’s 
emphasis on the interest convergence thesis never directly addresses, evaluates, nor 
studies the true interests of Black student-athletes.194 McCormick and McCormick 
do manage to accurately assert that the NCAA’s interests guarantee that the pre-
dominately Black workforce (student-athletes in revenue generating sports) re-
ceives relatively little of the financial windfall of college athletics while, at the 
same time, the school and white athletic coaches and administrators profit im-
mensely.195 The work of Shaun R. Harper, noted scholar in critical race theory in 
higher education, further casts doubt on the academic experiences, outcomes, and 
benefits of integrated Division I athletics in the most profitable and highly-ranked 
athletics programs in basketball and football.196 Without evidence of the expressed 
interests of Black student-athletes, we suggest that white stakeholders, rather than 
Black student-athletes, are privileged to determine and announce the interests of 
Black student-athletes. To this point, the NCAA overtly and incessantly argues that 
sports are not the goal of its athletes.197 Jamel K. Donnor, however, suggests that 
Black students are more likely than white students to see sports as the endgame of 
 _________________________  
 188. Id. at 61. 
 189. Admittedly, Thompson Dorsey & Venzant Chambers never explicitly make this argument. Here we are 
reading beyond the words presented by the authors. In doing so, we suggest that the article, while theoretically and 
logically sound, fails to account for the fact that racism is inherently irrational. Thus, it is hard of us to understand 
how racism would not already be cured if white people—en masse—were behaving rationally or intended to 
eradicate racism. 
 190. Bell, supra note 161, at 522–23. Although he is not often given credit for this, Bell’s statement is the 
precursor to Bonilla-Silva’s Abstract Liberalism Thesis. 
 191. See generally Amy C. McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, Race and Interest Convergence in NCAA 
Sports, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 18 (2012).  
 192. Id. at 28 n.59. 
 193. See id. at 17. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 24. 
 196. See Harper, supra note 180, at 32. 
 197. McCormick, supra note 191, at 21. 
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their participation in intercollegiate athletics.198 Although scholars have argued that 
the interest convergence thesis is a pathway to a more equitable existence for Black 
people, the work of McCormick and McCormick and others highlights the ways in 
which the interest convergence thesis might fail to fulfill the interests of Black 
people (individually or collectively), especially as compared to white interests.199 
The same issue of a lack of true interest convergence is apparent in the area of 
higher education admissions.200 
Lori D. Patton asserts that the use of critical race theory in higher education 
must highlight the racism and white supremacy of higher education through the 
acknowledgement of the violent, imperialistic, and oppressive history of higher 
education.201 From their respective beginnings, institutions of higher education 
have benefited from existing legislation to effectuate racial oppression; this is still a 
reality for contemporary institutions of higher education.202 For instance, many of 
the purportedly most prestigious institutions of higher education were involved in 
or supported slavery.203 Many of these institutions have endowments that dwarf 
institutions dedicated to educating Black people; these endowments are the relics 
of the institutions’ involvement with the enslavement of Black people.204  
HBCUs face other barriers to offering equitable educational opportunities and 
outcomes for their students. Historically, the federal government refused to fund or 
support the earliest HBCUs.205 As such, missionaries and philanthropists supported 
the higher education of Black people while white institutions of higher education 
enjoyed the support of the federal and state governments as well as the support of 
missionaries and philanthropists.206 Ironically, HBCUs’ collective and individual 
relevance and continued existence is continuously questioned with little acknowl-
edgement of how law and policy have aided in the oppression of HBCUs and their 
students.207 White people often criticize efforts aimed at altering or destroying 
macrostructures that maintain the advantages and privileges that sustain dispropor-
tionately white enrollment at state-sponsored colleges and universities. Without 
evidence—and often against irrefutable evidence to the contrary—white litigants, 
such as Abigail Fisher, argue that efforts to level the playing field are reverse rac-
ism.208 Thus, some scholars have argued that white people’s recent attacks on af-
 _________________________  
 198. Jamel K. Donnor, Towards an Interest-Convergence in the Education of African American Football 
Student-Athletes in Major College Sports, 8 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 45, 48 (2005). 
 199. See generally McCormick, supra note 191, at 31. 
 200. See Nelson, supra note 8 (providing more information on this topic, and constructing challenges to 
affirmative action policies as white people’s continued interposition to equity for and inclusion of black people). 
 201. Lori D. Patton, Disrupting Postsecondary Prose: Toward a Critical Race Theory of Higher Education, 
51 URB. EDUC. 315, 317 (2015). 
 202. See id. at 319–21. 
 203. See generally CRAIG STEVEN WILDER, EBONY AND IVY: RACE, SLAVERY, AND THE TROUBLED 
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES (2013). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Patton, supra note 201, at 331.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Jamel K. Donnor, Lies, Myths, Stock Stories, and Other Tropes, Understanding Race and Whites’ 
Policy Preferences in Education, 51 URB. EDUC. 343, 344 (2016). 
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firmative action programs can be viewed as a strategic white racial project to sub-
jugate Black people.209 
There is relatively little scholarship on the impact of interest convergence on 
HBCUs. We will hereafter discuss the interest convergence thesis in relationship to 
HBCUs. We ultimately argue that future work on the interest convergence thesis 
must explicitly explore the core interests of Black people. We further argue that the 
interest convergence thesis falters in that white people never (chiefly) have the 
interests of Black people in mind or at heart when making decisions. Finally, we 
showcase how white people, especially policymakers and agenda setters, hijack, 
displace, and otherwise dismiss the interests of Black people. We employ the Ayers 
case, a long-running higher education equity federal lawsuit in Mississippi, as a 
case study. We now briefly recount the Ayers case having already provided a more 
in-depth discussion of the interplay between affirmative action policies and the 
subjugation of Black people. 
The Ayers case is a relatively rare case in higher education equity. The plain-
tiffs in the Ayers case requested, as relief for state-sponsored segregation, equitable 
financing of HBCUs and the dismantling of admissions and recruitment policies 
that produced de jure segregation.210 Because the Ayers case arrived on the federal 
docket near the end of the civil rights era, the argument in the case suggests that 
litigants realized that traditional desegregation litigation—aimed at integrating the 
student body of traditionally white institutions—often resulted in outcomes that 
were limited in scope as compared to litigation aimed at funding equity—which 
has a better track record of building the infrastructure necessary for sustained edu-
cational equity and quality education.211 The result of the Ayers case was that both 
traditionally white institutions and HBCUs were required to attempt to attract stu-
dents of the opposite race.212  
However, the court’s reliance on the diversity rationale neglected multiple im-
portant facts. Firstly, HBCUs had no documented or earnestly alleged history of 
discriminatory admissions practices against white applicants. The same could not 
be said of traditionally white institutions. Likewise, there was a dearth of white 
applicants—a nod to racism—applying for admission into HBCUs.213 As evidence 
of this, HBCUs were initially designed and developed to maintain the all-white 
enrollment at Mississippi’s traditionally white institutions. Furthermore, HBCUs 
were woefully underfunded, making them unattractive to white applicants. Still, the 
presidents of Mississippi’s HBCUs had historically marketed their institutions as 
being a lower cost alternative to the state’s traditionally white institutions for all 
Mississippians.214 The ultimate solution to Black people’s complaints in the Ayers 
case focused on enhancing the enrollment of white students at Mississippi’s 
 _________________________  
 209. See id.; see also Nelson, supra note 8, at 309–10. 
 210. Crystal Gafford Muhammad, Mississippi Higher Education Desegregation and the Interest Conver-
gence Principle: A CRT Analysis of the ‘Ayers Settlement’, 12 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 319, 323 (2009). 
 211. Id. at 323. 
 212. Id. at 328. 
 213. Id. at 324. 
 214. Id. at 325. 
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HBCUs.215 To that end, a supermajority of the slightly more than half-billion dol-
lars allocated to Mississippi’s HBCUs as a result of the Ayers case was directed 
towards the recruitment and retention of white students at HBCUs.  
Furthermore, some monies awarded after the Ayers settlement were open to all 
colleges and universities in Mississippi, even those whose policies and actions cre-
ated the need for a federal lawsuit to secure the equitable treatment of Black people 
and HBCUs.216 Under the settlement in the Ayers case, Mississippi’s HBCUs could 
be denied their entitled funds if their respective white student enrollments fell be-
low 10%.217 The end of the Ayers case resulted in Mississippi’s HBCUs receiving 
the lion’s share—or nearly all—of the judicial sanctions.218 On the other hand, tra-
ditionally white institutions escaped with little discipline, reprisal, or shaming for 
their discriminatory behaviors. At the end of the day, HBCUs were charged with 
effectuating the justice for which the original plaintiffs fought.219 Despite contesta-
tion from some Black people, including some of the original plaintiffs in the Ayers 
case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal referred to the state’s obligation in the set-
tlement as generous.220 
V. THE IMPORTANCE AND POTENTIAL OF THE HBCU 
HBCUs are institutions of higher learning that have a history unique to the 
Black community. HBCUs are colleges and universities that were founded prior to 
the civil rights movement, and all HBCUs have the mission of educating Black 
students.221 The earliest HBCUs were established in the 1800s, and the First and 
Second Morrill Acts played tremendous roles in the number of HBCUs that were 
established through much of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.222 
Moreover, the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments aided in the 
opening of many HBCUs.223 It was the passage of the Second Morrill Act of 1890 
that allowed for, and supported, segregation in higher education.224 According to 
M. Christopher Brown,  
The act specifically prohibited payments of federal funds to 
states that discriminated against blacks in the admission to tax-
supported colleges or who refused to provide “separate but equal” 
facilities for the two races. It was this latter clause that led to the 
 _________________________  
 215. Id. at 323. 
 216. See Muhammad, supra note 210, at 327. 
 217. Id. at 331. 
 218. Id. at 328. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. THURGOOD MARSHALL COLLEGE FUND, supra note 1. 
 222. Nicole C. Barnett, Sydney Freeman, Jr., & Melissa L. Freeman, Higher Education as a Field of Study 
at Minority Serving Institutions, 40 W.J. OF BLACK STUD. 205, 207 (2016); see also M. Christopher  
Brown & James Earl Davis, The Historically Black College as Social Contract, Social Capital, and Social Equal-
izer, 76 PEABODY J. EDUC. 31, 34 (2001). 
 223. Brown, supra note 222, at 35–36.  
 224. Id. at 36. 
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immediate establishment of [black] public land-grant institutions 
in seventeen of the nineteen southern states.225  
Southern states, for agriculture was a major contributor to the economies in 
many former confederate states, ultimately benefitted from creating separate and 
unequal institutions of higher learning for Black students because they were able to 
further reproduce white segregationist ideology.  
HBCUs also provide access to higher education for Black students and create 
spaces where black students benefit academically and socially; Black students are 
also more culturally comfortable at HBCUs.226 There are 102 HBCUs—51 public 
and 51 private—located in 19 states, Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands.227 Black HBCU students received 81% of bachelor’s degrees and 70% of 
master’s degrees conferred in spring 2016.228 Moreover, HBCU enrollment is on 
the rise at many institutions.229 During the 2016-2017 academic year, Alcorn State 
University of Lorman, Mississippi saw an increase of 38%; America’s largest 
HBCU, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, had the high-
est enrollment in the institution’s then 127-year history, and Kentucky State Uni-
versity had a striking 160% increase in enrollment.230  
HBCUs, familiar with Black culture’s value of community have additionally 
reproduced social relationships and networks where Black people have been able to 
maximize social capital.231 HBCUs have trained leaders, such as Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, and Ella Baker, all of whom were civil rights leaders 
in the Black community.232 HBCU-graduated leaders are so important due to being 
indigenous to their communities. The HBCU community often aids in leaders’ abil-
ities to connect with, influence, and lead multiple communities.233 HBCUs afford 
Black people the opportunity to live in, learn in, and contribute to the diversity of 
the Black experience. Furthermore, Black people often embrace concepts of leader-
ship that are divergent from the concepts of leadership that are prominent in the 
white community. Black leaders further understand the community’s culture and 
history and are truly committed to adding capital within those communities, which 
is key in raising influence of Black institutions within the Black community.234  
HBCUs, as potentially fertile ground for growing these leaders, have the potential 
to contribute to the development of these leaders. Therefore, Black HBCU gradu-
 _________________________  
 225. Id. 
 226. Robert Palmer, The Perceived Elimination of Affirmative Action and the Strengthening of Historically 
Black Colleges and Universities, 40 J. BLACK STUD. 762, 764 (2010). 
 227. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 2. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Paula Rogo, HBCU Enrollment Numbers Continue to Grow Another Year, ESSENCE (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.essence.com/news/hbcu-enrollment-increase/.   
 230. Id. 
 231. Brown, supra note 222, at 42. 
 232. Palmer, supra note 226, at 763. 
 233. See Ijeoma E. Ononuju, Legacy, Loyalty, and Leadership: Creating a Pipeline of Indigenous Black 
Educational Leaders, 12 J. URB. LEARNING 99, 100 (2016). 
 234. See id. at 104. 
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ates can and do play a significant role in combating antiblack policies, especially 
antiblack policies in education. 
Further, enrollments of underrepresented groups at state flagships and many 
other traditionally white institutions have declined.235 Affirmative action bans and 
the Supreme Court of the United States’s embrace of the diversity rationale have 
resulted in the greatest decrease of enrollment for underrepresented populations in 
undergraduate and graduate fields of study at larger traditionally white research 
universities.236 Also, as the courts have limited the use of race-conscious admis-
sions policies, Black students are less likely to apply to selective colleges and uni-
versities if race is not considered.237 Attempts by traditionally white institutions to 
create alternative admissions policies to boost enrollment numbers of Black and 
underrepresented students have not been as successful.238 Therefore, HBCUs have 
the opportunity to recruit these students. As HBCUs continue to produce leaders 
based on graduating large numbers of Black students and preparing these individu-
als to compete globally, HBCU graduate programs that focus on leadership are 
essential in molding current and future Black leaders that challenge whiteness and 
focus on the Black worldview as the dominant lens in dealing with Black success 
and issues.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Affirmative action higher education policy will continue to be in the interest of 
white people for whiteness colonizes anything it feels will benefit its own group. 
When the historical elements of affirmative action are disregarded, antiblack poli-
cies that aim to silence and erase Black suffering are reproduced. To combat such 
policies, Black people must continue to reproduce an ideology that focuses solely 
on the Black worldview. HBCUs have great potential in this regard because of their 
genuine connections to Black students. HBCUs continue to educate a dispropor-
tionate number of Black college graduates and more importantly, career profes-
sionals. HBCUs are, in general, safer spaces for Black students to learn, especially 
individuals from low-income environments.239 Furthermore, the HBCU network is 
an interwoven system made up of individuals that can be used to increase access—
at the collegiate and professional level—for Black students, which is key to 
fighting against antiblack policies, including antiblack affirmative action poli-
cies.240  
However, as the number of Black students at more highly selective PWIs con-
tinues to fall due to the limitations of affirmative action policies, HBCUs can use 
this phenomenon to increase resources from state and federal governments.241 As 
 _________________________  
 235. Glasener, supra note 6, at 2. 
 236. Garces, supra note 78, at 252. 
 237. Glasener, supra note 6, at 3. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Adam Harris, Black College Renaissance: Students Are Once Again Flocking to HBCUs, THE CHRON.  
HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Why-Many-Black-Colleges-Are/24267.  
 240. See id. 
 241. Palmer, supra note 226, at 772. 
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more Black students flock to HBCUs, these institutions must be supported to be 
able to recruit and retain these students as well as faculty and staff. HBCU alumni 
and communities should also buy into being a part of the Black colleges’ continued 
commitment to serving underrepresented peoples. Although we do not here assert 
that HBCUs are a place of equity and inclusion for all Black people, we do assert 
that HBCUs are necessary in ensuring access for Black students to higher educa-
tion even in a society of antiblack affirmative action policies aimed to benefit white 
people. 
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